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THE COST OF INDEFINITELY KICKING THE CAN: WHY CONTINUED
“PROLONGED” DETENTION IS NO SOLUTION TO GUANTÁNAMO
Devon Chaffee *
On January 22, 2009 President Barack Obama committed to close the
Guantánamo Bay detention facilities and established a process for
reviewing the cases of the remaining detainees. In a May, the President
indicated that this review would result in a “fifth category” of detainees
who the administration would not seek to prosecute in U.S. courts or
transfer or repatriate to other countries, but who would be kept in
“prolonged” detention. This essay argues that continued indefinite
detention of the detainees currently held at Guantánamo Bay threatens to
undermine the imperative security and foreign policy objectives that the
closure of the detention facility would otherwise achieve. Continuing to kick
the cases of a category of detainees down the road for indefinite, repeated
review will impede efforts to close the door on the legacy of flawed
detention policies that the Guantánamo facilities have come to represent.
I. INTRODUCTION
On January 22, 2009, President Barack Obama issued an executive
order that laid out strong guidance for closing the Guantánamo Bay detention facility. 1 The order launched a case-by-case review of the Guantánamo
detainees led by the Justice Department, emphasized civilian courts as the
appropriate forum for criminal trials, and underscored the importance of
diplomatic efforts to facilitate the transfer and release of detainees. 2 These
provisions inspired hope that Guantánamo’s legacy of illegal detention and
ill-treatment could be brought to end in a manner that would restore confidence in American justice and in the U.S. as a country committed to upholding the rule of law.
Since January 22, and despite allegations about the lack of a cohesive plan and President’s announcement that it will not meet the one year
deadline, the Obama administration has made measureable progress towards
closing the facility. As of November 24, the number of detainees in U.S.
custody in Guantánamo has dropped from approximately two-hundred forty
*
1
2

Advocacy Counsel at Human Rights First.
Exec. Order No. 13,492, 74 Fed. Reg. 4,897 (Jan. 22, 2009).
Id. at 4,899.
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to two-hundred fifteen. 3 The President has announced the transfer of the
five alleged conspirators in the 9/11 attacks and one detainee, Ahmed Guiliani, has been transferred and is being prosecuted in the Southern District
of New York. 4 Dozens of other cases have reportedly been referred to prosecutors for trials before district courts and the Senate and the House have
recently voted in favor of allowing these detainees to be brought to the U.S.
to stand trial. 5 Nineteen additional detainees have been repatriated or transferred to other countries, with six European governments receiving or agreeing to receive detainees. 6 In June, the European Union (EU) members issued a joint statement with the U.S. setting forth a framework for the transfer of detainees cleared for release to European allies willing to help the
U.S. “turn the page . . . in a manner that comports with the rule of law.” 7
Notwithstanding progress in civilian court prosecutions, repatriation, and transfer of those held at Guantánamo, President Obama announced
at the National Archives Building in May his intention to continue to indefinitely detain some prisoners without trial after the January deadline for

3

Associated Press, Guantanamo by the Numbers, http://www.miamiherald.com/news/
world/AP/story/1332285.html (last visited Nov. 24, 2009).
4
Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Attorney General Announces Forum Decisions for
Guantanamo Detainees (Nov. 13, 2009), available at http://www.justice.gov/ag/speeches/
2009/ag-speech-091113.html.
5
See Gitmo Cases Referred to U.S. Prosecutors, CBS NEWS, Aug. 3, 2009,
http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/2009/08/03/national/main5208364.shtml; U.S. HOUSE OF
REPRESENTATIVES, ROLL CALL VOTE NUMBER 746 (Oct. 1, 2009); U.S. SENATE ROLL CALL
VOTE NUMBER 00038 (Nov. 5, 2009).
6
See David Johnston, Uighurs Leave Guantánamo for Palau, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 31, 2009,
at A22, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2009/11/01/world/asia/01uighurs.html?_r=1;
Peter Finn, Administration Makes Progress on Resettling Detainees, WASH. POST, Aug. 20,
2009, at A03; Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, United States Transfers Two Guantanamo
Bay Detainees to the Government of Portugal (Aug. 28, 2009), available at http://www.
justice.gov/opa/pr/2009/August/09-ag-892.html; Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, United
States Transfers Guantanamo Bay Detainee to Afghanistan (Aug. 24, 2009), available at
http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/2009/August/09-ag-837.html; Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of
Justice, United States Transfers Three Guantanamo Detainees to the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia (June 12, 2009), available at http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/2009/June/09-ag-587.html;
Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, United States Transfers Two Guantanamo Detainees to
Foreign Nations (June 11, 2009), available at http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/2009/June/
09-ag-580.html; Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, United States Transfers Lakhdar Boumediene to France (May 15, 2009), available at http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/2009/May/
09-ag-477.html.
7
Press Release, Council of the European Union, Joint Statement of the European Union
and its Member States and the United States of America on the Closure of the Guantanamo
Bay Detention Facility and Future Counterterrorism Cooperation (June 11, 2009), available at http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_Data/docs/pressdata/en/gena/108455.pdf
[hereinafter Council of the EU].

2009]

THE COST OF INDEFINITELY KICKING THE CAN

189

closing the detention facility. 8 The President described the potential scope
of such detention to include those currently detained who the administration
asserts cannot be prosecuted—some he admitted due to “tainted evidence”—and who the administration does not want to release because they
pose a security threat. 9
To allow Guantánamo detainees to continue to languish in U.S. custody without trial, however, will jeopardize the very national security and
foreign policy objectives that the administration is looking to achieve by
closing the facility. 10 Putting detainees into indefinite detention in a new
facility will simply serve to transfer the problem, not solve it, kicking the
most difficult cases down the road for repeated review 11 and protracted litigation. Such a scheme would also risk tainting the legitimacy of U.S. detainee operations in theaters of armed conflict by potentially sparking fears
that the mistakes at Guantánamo may be repeated. If the U.S. is to truly turn
the page on past detention policy, the Obama administration must continue
to vigorously pursue options for implementing its commitment to closing
Guantánamo in a manner that fully comports with fundamental principles of
justice and the rule of law.
II. ACHIEVING U.S. NATIONAL SECURITY AND FOREIGN POLICY GOALS IN
CLOSING GUANTÁNAMO
The most oft cited reasons by current and former government officials for closing Guantánamo is the damage that Guantánamo detention
policies have had on the reputation of the U.S. and on U.S. counterinsurgency and counterterrorism efforts. Intelligence experts, diplomats, military
leaders, former Secretaries of Defense, and former Secretaries of State all
recognize that the Guantánamo legacy has hurt our relationships with our
allies and our counterinsurgency and counterterrorism efforts. 12 In January,
Dennis Blair, then the nominee for Director of National Intelligence testified, “I agree with the President that the detention center at Guantanamo has
become a damaging symbol to the world and that it must be closed. It is a
8

See President Barack Obama, Remarks on National Security (May 21, 2009), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/the_press_office/Remarks-by-the-President-On-NationalSecurity-5-21-09/ [hereinafter Remarks on National Security].
9
Id.
10
Id.
11
Testimony of Attorney General Eric Holder Before the Senate Judiciary Committee
(Nov. 18, 2009) (“There would be continuous reviews, as I said to make sure that person’s
detention—continued detention —was appropriate.”) (on file with author).
12
Dennis Blair, Statement Before the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence 7 (Jan. 22,
2009), available at http://www.dni.gov/testimonies/20090122_testimony.pdf; Thom Shanker, Gates Counters Putin’s Words on U.S. Power, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 12, 2007, at A6, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2007/02/12/world/europe/12gates.html.

190

CASE W. RES. J. INT’L L.

[Vol. 42:187

rallying cry for terrorist recruitment and harmful to our national security, so
closing it is important for our national security.” 13
If the administration continues to indefinitely detain Guantánamo
detainees without trial or charge, it risks prolonging the legacy of flawed
and illegal detention policies that Guantánamo has come to symbolize. One
week before the President’s National Archive speech, three retired senior
military leaders wrote the President stating that attempting to establish a
system of indefinite detention without trial would perpetuate “the harmful
symbolism of Guantánamo, undermining our counterterrorism efforts and
squandering an opportunity to demonstrate the strength of the American
system of justice.” 14 The letter goes on to state:
The Guantánamo detentions have shown that assessments of dangerousness based not on overt acts, as in a criminal trial, but on association are
unreliable and will inevitably lead to costly mistakes. This is precisely
why national security preventive detention schemes have proven a dismal
failure in other countries. The potential gains from such schemes are simply not great enough to warrant departure from hundreds of years of west15
ern criminal justice traditions.

The military leaders recognize the disagreeable company that the
U.S. keeps when engaging in indefinite detention without trial. U.S. allies in
Europe have implemented no comparable long term detention scheme in
armed conflict or administrative preventive detention outside of the deportation context. 16 The governments of countries in Egypt, Malaysia, Zimbabwe, and Kenya have authorized indefinite or successive detention
schemes in the name of fighting threats from terrorists or insurgents and all
those schemes have resulted in violations of fundamental due process
norms. 17 In response to this criticism, such governments have cited Guantánamo Bay detention policies to justify repressive schemes of prolonged
13

Blair, supra note 12.
Letter from Vice Admiral Lee F. Gunn, Rear Admiral John D. Hutson, and Brigadier
General James P. Cullen to President Barack Obama (May 14, 2009), available at http://
www.humanrightsfirst.org/pdf/090515-etn-opp-mil-camp.pdf.
15
Id. at 2.
16
Hearing on the Legal, Moral and National Security Consequences of Prolonged Detention: Before Subcomm. on the Constitution of the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 111th Cong.
(2009) (statement of Sarah H. Cleveland, Professor of Human and Constitutional Rights,
Columbia Law School), available at http://judiciary.senate.gov/hearings/hearing.cfm?id=
3896.
17
See PREVENTIVE DETENTION AND SECURITY LAW: A COMPARATIVE STUDY (Andrew
Harding & John Hatchard eds. 1993); INTERNATIONAL COMMISSION OF JURISTS, EMINENT
JURISTS PANEL ON TERRORISM, COUNTER-TERRORISM AND HUMAN RIGHTS, ASSESSING
DAMAGE, URGING ACTION: REPORT ON TERRORISM, COUNTER-TERRORISM AND HUMAN
RIGHTS (2009), available at news.bbc.co.uk/2/shared/bsp/hi/pdfs/16_02_09_ejp_report.pdf.
14
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detention without trial—schemes that the U.S. criticizes as authorized arbitrary detention. 18
Indefinite detention regimes aimed at preventing security risks are
known to foster human rights abuses and to create perverse incentives
against bringing criminal charges against prisoners. That is why the U.S.
has been consistently critical of governments that detain indefinitely without
charge, including regimes that involve successive review or unrestrained
renewable time limits. 19 If the Obama administration continues to pursue a
detention regime for former Guantánamo detainees that permits indefinite
detention without charge, it will impact detention policies of governments
throughout the world and will likely embolden other governments to
circumvent the protections guaranteed in criminal trials by citing security
concerns.
The world is watching to see whether the Obama administration fulfills its promise to close Guantánamo, but also to see how it faces the difficult questions that must be confronted to truly resolve the detainee cases
and not simply move them elsewhere. If the handling of the former Guantánamo detainees falls short of the standards that U.S. allies expect, those
allies are likely to have continuing concerns about cooperating with the U.S.
in joint detention operations. Moreover, if our European allies perceive that
the process afforded some of the Guantánamo detainees falls short of international standards, they will be less likely to continue to offer their much
needed assistance in relocating other detainees. When the Council for the
EU expressed support for receiving Guantánamo detainees it did so with the
explicit understanding that the underlying policy issues would be addressed
in a manner consistent with international law, presumably as that law is
understood not just by the U.S. but also by EU member states. 20
In his speech in May, the President spoke of continued detention at
Guantánamo as a system to “hold individuals to keep them from carrying
out an act of war . . . .”21 But the continued indefinite detention of Guantá18

See HUMAN RIGHTS FIRST, DEFENDING SECURITY: THE RIGHT TO DEFEND RIGHTS IN AN
AGE OF TERRORISM 8 (2004), available at http://www.humanrightsfirst.org/defenders/
hrd_global/Defending_Security_Draft.pdf (quoting Malaysian Minister of Justice Dr. Rais
Yatim, in Rais: Sept. 11 Rendered Consultation on Terror Laws Impossible, MALAYSIAKINI,
Dec. 12, 2003, http://malaysiakini.com/news/18103 (last visited Nov. 7, 2009)); U.S. DEP’T
OF STATE, 2008 HUMAN RIGHTS REPORT : MALAYSIA (Feb. 25, 2009), available at
http://www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/hrrpt/2008/eap/119046.htm (last visited Nov. 24, 2009).
19
See, e.g., U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, 2008 HUMAN RIGHTS REPORT : SINGAPORE (Feb. 25,
2009), available at http://www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/hrrpt/2008/eap/119056.htm (last visited
Nov. 24, 2009); U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, 2008 INVESTMENT CLIMATE STATEMENT: MALAYSIA
(2008), available at http://www.state.gov/e/eeb/ifd/2008/101777.htm (last visited Nov. 24,
2009).
20
Council of the EU, supra note 7.
21
Remarks on National Security, supra note 8.
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namo detainees under the auspices of a law of war framework is in stark
contrast to past examples of U.S. armed conflict detention or current detention policies in Iraq or Afghanistan. In previous conflicts, the U.S. afforded
prisoners the procedures proscribed in the Geneva Conventions 22 and U.S.
military regulation 23 at the point of capture and it released or transferred the
prisoners promptly upon the end of the conflict. 24 The prisoners currently
held at Guantánamo were afforded no review at the point of capture, and
many were held for over two years before any process was provided. As
Lawrence Wilkerson, Colin Powell’s chief of staff recently wrote, “no meaningful attempt at discrimination was made in-country by competent officials, civilian or military, as to who we were transporting to Cuba for detention and interrogation.” 25 That many of the Guantánamo detainees were
denied process at the point of capture and that they have already been detained for such an extended period of time increases the importance of ensuring that the cases are dealt with in a manner that is consistent with the
approach of our allies and with American traditions of justice. A policy that
involves continued indefinite detention without charge falls short of what is
needed to repair the damage inflicted on U.S. diplomatic power and ability
to champion human rights abroad.
III. STRATEGIC CONSEQUENCES FOR PERPETUATING A GLOBAL
INDEFINITE DETENTION SCHEME
Guantánamo was a key instrument in the Bush administration’s effort to wage a “Global War on Terror” which involved asserting a global
authority to bring individuals into U.S. custody regardless of their place of
capture. In exploiting this global detention authority, the Bush administration’s policies demonstrated a disregard not only for international law, but
also for the domestic laws of other countries in a manner that provoked outrage from the international community. In the context of the congressional
22

Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War art. 5, Aug. 12, 1949,
6 U.S.T. 3316, 75 U.N.T.S. 135; Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian
Persons in Time of War, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3516, 75 U.N.T.S. 287.
23
U.S. ARMY, ENEMY PRISONERS OF WAR, RETAINED PERSONNEL, CIVILIAN INTERNEES
AND OTHER DETAINEES, AR 190-8 (1997), available at http://www.army.mil/usapa/epubs/
pdf/r190_8.pdf .
24
See, e.g., No. 1991 Memorandum of Understanding Between the United States of
America and France on Repatriation and Liberation of Prisoners of War (Mar. 1947), available at http://untreaty.un.org/unts/1_60000/4/25/00007208.pdf (laying out a rate of repatriation of German prisoners of war at a rate of twenty thousand a month that would be completed by October 1, 1947).
25
Posting of Lawrence Wilkerson to the Washington Note (Mar. 17, 2009 19:27), http://
www.thewashingtonnote.com/archives/2009/03/some_truths_abo/ (last visited Nov. 24,
2009).
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debate, the Obama administration has expressed an interest not only in continued detention of Guantánamo detainees, but also in considering statutory
authority for long-term law of war detention beyond the Guantánamo context. 26 Continuing to pursue a global detention policy that ignores the relevant domestic legal, political, and strategic framework will prolong the
problems caused by the detentions at Guantánamo and by the Bush administration’s “Global War on Terror.”
The U.S. counterinsurgency manual, updated in 2006, makes clear
the importance of criminalizing insurgent behavior and grounding counterinsurgency efforts not only in U.S. domestic and international law, but also
in the laws of the host nation. The manual states:
When insurgents are seen as criminals they lose public support; if they are
dealt with by an established legal system in line with local culture and
practices, the legitimacy of the host government is enhanced . . . .
[P]articipation in counterinsurgency operations by United States forces
must be pursuant to United States law, which includes domestic laws and
international treaties to which the United States is party as well as certain
27
laws of the host nation.

The Obama administration has initiated many reforms in detention policy in
Afghanistan and Iraq that recognize the importance of ensuring that U.S.
detainee operations are seen as legitimate and lawful under international and
governing domestic law. In Afghanistan, the Department of Defense has
announced new procedures for detainees held at the Bagram Theater Internment Facility that take into consideration Afghan-run rehabilitation programs and the option of transfer to Afghan custody for prosecution. 28 While
these procedures fall short of establishing a clear domestic legal framework
for U.S. detention operations in Afghanistan, they recognize the importance
of tailoring detainee operations in order to reduce recidivism and win the
support of the local population. 29 Likewise, in Iraq the U.S. military continues to release and transfer detainees at a reported rate of approximately seven hundred and fifty a month as provided for in the Strategic Framework

26

H. Armed Services Comm. Hearing on Reforming the Military Commissions Act of 2006
and Detainee Policy (2009) (opening statement of Chairman Ike Skelton), available at
http://www.loc.gov/rr/frd/Military_Law/pdf/House-Armed-Services-July-24-2009.pdf.
27
U.S. ARMY/MARINE CORPS COUNTERINSURGENCY FIELD MANUAL 1-19 (2006), available
at http://www.fas.org/irp/doddir/army/fm3-24fd.pdf.
28
See Brief for Respondents-Appellants at 11, Al Maqaleh v. Gates, No. 09-5265 (D.C.
Cir. 2009), available at http://www.scotusblog.com/wp/wp-content/uploads/2009/09/USBagram-brief-9-14-09.pdf.
29
See U.S. DEP’T OF DEFENSE, COMISAF INITIAL ASSESSMENT (UNCLASSIFIED) 26–27,
available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2009/09/21/AR2009
092100110.html (declassified on Sept. 21, 2009).
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Agreement that came into effect on January 1st. 30 On September 16, the
U.S. military announced the closure of the U.S. maintained prison camp
Camp Bucca, once the largest prisons in Iraq, transferring all remaining
detainees to Iraqi prisons. 31
Codifying a global system of U.S. detention would inevitably restrict the ability of the U.S. to ensure that U.S. detention policies adhere to
domestic legal requirements and strategic needs in countries where the U.S.
is engaged in armed conflict. A detention scheme that purports to provide
procedures for all U.S. detentions operations worldwide will complicate
efforts to ensure that the detention practices on the ground are consistent
with the laws of the host nation and perceived as legitimate by the local
population. For instance, the scheme for armed conflict detention proposed
by the Senate Armed Services Committee in 2008 made no reference to the
importance of involving the domestic government or considering the applicable domestic law. 32 The provision, if adopted, would also have mandated
access only to a U.S. adjudicatory system even where access to review before a domestic body or a hybrid system that incorporates representation
from the domestic government would have been more appropriate. 33
The consequences of the codification of a global detention reform
outside of a country where the U.S. is actively engaged in hostilities is
equally concerning. The global approach to executive detention authority
led the Bush administration to pickup individuals far from any situation of
armed conflict—including the streets of Bosnia, Thailand, Indonesia, Mauritania and elsewhere—and to transfer them to Guantánamo. Continued
assertion of the authority to take individuals into U.S. custody from anywhere in the world, outside of any law enforcement context, will threaten to
undermine international standards for transfers of individuals across national borders. It would also set a dangerous example for other countries facing
security threats. The American public would—rightfully—be outraged if
foreign governments came into U.S. territory and took individuals into custody without affording them any domestic process. Presumably this is, in
part, why at his confirmation hearing in January, now CIA Director Leon
Panetta asserted that under his watch the CIA would not be transferring
detainees to the custody of other governments or to black sites for the pur-

30

Richard Tomkins, Iraqi Detainee Numbers Lessen, UPI.COM, July 16, 2009,
http://www.upi.com/Top_News/Special/2009/07/16/Iraqi-detainee-numbers-lessen/UPI42561247782916.
31
See Steven Lee Meyers, The Green Zone Takes Fire for a Second Day During Biden’s
Visit to Baghdad, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 17, 2009, at A12.
32
National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2008 (Reported in Senate), S. 1547
(June 5, 2007).
33
Id.
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pose of long-term detention without trial and interrogation. 34 On the other
hand, the establishment of a new authority or new procedures that continue
to be based on the premise that the U.S. is rightfully engaged in a global
detention enterprise will spark justified concerns that not only has the U.S.
failed to resolve the legacy of Guantánamo, but it has left the door open for
that legacy to be repeated in the future.
IV. INDEFINITELY KICKING THE CAN AND THE TRUE MEANING OF
“PROLONGED” DETENTION
President Obama’s pledge to close the Guantánamo detention facility within one year implicitly acknowledges that absent a firm deadline the
situation could fester indefinitely. In defending the administration’s decision
to close Guantánamo, Secretary Gates asserted his commitment to confronting the tough decisions that had to be made about detainee cases. Secretary
Gates stated in January:
I believe that if we did not have a deadline, we could kick that can down
the road endlessly . . . the only way we’ll come to grips with some of the
tough decisions that have to be made with respect to Guantanamo is by
having a deadline that then forces the rest of us to turn to and figure out
35
solutions to some of these problems.

But leaving a category of the Guantánamo detainees that are not charged or
transferred in unending limbo will be, in effect, sidestepping the difficult
issues and putting off the hard cases for potentially lifetimes.
After all, the Guantánamo detainees are being held in the context of
a counterterrorism struggle without a foreseeable end. Given the indefinite
nature of the current conflict some suggest that periodic review can cure the
indefinite nature of continued detention of those in Guantánamo. But the
detention authority being asserted by the administration and interpreted by
the D.C. district court is one that is based on an evaluation of the detainees’
past acts. Hence, an individual’s detention status, as determined by either
the administration or the courts, will not change so long as the conflict continues. Whether or not the Obama administration conducts a periodic review
to consider the threat posed by or intelligence value of a detainee, as the
Bush administration did with the Annual Review Boards at Guantánamo,
the Obama administration is still asserting the legal authority to detain indefinitely.

34

Hearing Before the Sen. Select Comm. on Intelligence on the Nomination of Leon Panetta to Be Director of the CIA (Feb. 5, 2009) (on file with author).
35
Testimony of Defense Secretary Robert Gates Before the H. Armed Services Comm.
(Jan. 27, 2009) (on file with author).
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The prohibition against indefinite detention is one of the most important principles governing detention under international humanitarian and
international human rights law. 36 In asserting the need for a new legal regime to continue to detain without trial, Senator Lindsay Graham stated in
May: “[T]his war is different. There will never be an end to this war. . . . An
enemy combatant determination could be a de facto life sentence.” 37 That
Senator Graham, a influential member the Senate Armed Services Committee, contemplates a war without end in which the U.S. will hold detainees
for the rest of their lives without trial sends a disturbing message about the
indefinite nature of any continued detention of Guantánamo detainees without trial, with or without periodic review.
V. CONCLUSION
The detention policies pursued by the Bush administration at Guantánamo were a costly mistake and President Obama set his administration
on the right path on his second full day in office when he laid out a process
for closing the detention facility. But if the administration continues to indefinitely detain without trial under a new scheme, it will risk simply transferring the problems caused by the Guantánamo detentions and perpetuating
the detrimental impact on essential foreign policy and national security
goals. Kicking Guantánamo cases down the road for continued, prolonged,
and repeated review will impede the administration’s efforts to enlist the
power of fundamental American values and to pursue a counterterrorism
strategy that strengthens our ability to cooperate will U.S. allies. It will also
impede the ability of the U.S. to advance democracy and the rule of law
around the world. Only by firmly rejecting a policy of continued indefinite
detention will the Obama administration be able to truly turn the page on
Guantánamo.

36

Jelena Pejic, Procedural Principles and Safeguards for Internment/Administrative Detention in Armed Conflict and Other Situations of Violence, 87 INT’L REV. RED CROSS 375,
382 n.25 (2005) (citing Report of the Working Group on Arbitrary Detention, ¶ 60, U.N.
Doc. E/CN.4/2004/3 (Dec. 15, 2003) (“[I]n no event may an arrest based on emergency
legislation last indefinitely . . . .”); ANNUAL REPORT OF THE INTER-AMERICAN COMMISSION
ON HUMAN RIGHTS 1976, OAS Doc. OEA/Ser.L/V/II.40. (“[T]he declaration of a state of
emergency or a state of siege cannot serve as a pretext for the indefinite detention of individuals, without any charge whatever. It is obvious that when these security measures are extended beyond a reasonable time they become true and serious violations of the right to freedom . . . .”).
37
115 CONG. REC. S5652 (daily ed. May 20, 2009) (statement of Sen. Graham).

